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ABSTRACT 
 
In studies of primarily large, established firms, researchers find that increasing managerial 
ownership increases firm value, at least in some ranges of ownership.  This evidence suggests that 
increasing managerial ownership can decrease net agency costs.  Our study investigates 
managerial ownership and firm value for an atypical sample: very small, young, and fast-growing 
firms.  We argue that increasing managerial ownership likely increases net agency costs in small, 
entrepreneurial firms.  Consistent with this argument, we find that entrepreneurial firm value is 
positively related to outside board member ownership, but negatively related to inside board 
member ownership.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
he finance literature is rich with theories that explain the influence of ownership structure on firm value.  
Earlier writers argue that, from an outside shareholder‟s point of view, there are potential benefits and 
potential costs to increasing the share ownership of corporate management.  Increasing managerial 
ownership can align the incentives of managers and outside shareholders by making managerial wealth more sensitive 
to changes in stock price.  Thus, increasing managerial ownership can focus managers on share value maximization 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Alternatively, increasing managerial ownership can entrench managers (Stulz, 1988) or 
lead them to choose risk-reducing projects that are not value maximizing (Amihud and Lev, 1981). 
 
Prior researchers find that managerial ownership is positively related to firm value, at least over certain 
ranges of ownership.  For example, in a study of Fortune 500 firms, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find that 
Tobin‟s Q rises as inside ownership increases from 0 to 5%, falls as inside board ownership increases from 5 to 25%, 
and rises again as inside ownership climbs above 25%.  They observe the same curvilinear relationship between Q and 
outside ownership.  Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) specifically state in the conclusion of their article that they 
have focused on very large and older firms.  They suggest that future research is needed to examine ownership 
structure in different types of firms.  
  
McConnell and Servaes (1990) find that Q increases with director and officer ownership until ownership 
reaches 40 to 50%, but they do not distinguish between inside and outside directors.  Mehran (1995) finds a positive, 
linear relationship, between CEO ownership and Q.  Although McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Mehran (1995) 
include some small firms in their samples, their studies still emphasize larger, more established firms, relative to the 
typical U.S. business.  For reasons explained below, the evidence from these studies cannot necessarily be generalized 
to “entrepreneurial firms,” which we define as very small, young, and fast-growing firms.   
 
We develop a unique sample of entrepreneurial firms with which to analyze the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm value.  Entrepreneurial firms differ from other firms in important respects. First, because 
T 
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these firms are very small, they‟re more likely to become takeover targets.  Comment and Schwert (1993) review the 
literature on takeover probability and they estimate factors that influence takeover probability.  Comment and Schwert 
conclude that the only factor consistently shown to have an influence is firm size.  Smaller firms are much more likely 
to become takeover targets than larger firms.  Thus, managers of entrepreneurial firms should face relatively intense 
external monitoring and discipline from the corporate control market.   
 
Second, because entrepreneurial firms are very small and young, they‟re more likely to have a high 
percentage of shares concentrated in the hands of outside directors (who are often professional financiers of young, 
high growth firms, e.g., venture capitalists).  Obviously, the wealth constraints to ownership concentration are reduced 
for very small firms.  In the event inside board members of entrepreneurial firms are not entrenched through their own 
high share ownership, outside board members with high share ownership can provide further external monitoring of 
managers, as well as valuable strategic advice.  Finally, because entrepreneurial firms are fast growing, they‟re more 
likely to have valuable investment opportunities and less likely to suffer the agency costs of free cash flow.   
 
These two characteristics of entrepreneurial firms, greater external monitoring of managers and lesser free 
cash flow, suggest that the benefits of increasing managerial ownership should be relatively low for entrepreneurial 
firm shareholders.  If managers are closely monitored by outsiders and they have no free cash flow to squander, they 
are less able to take actions that harm outside shareholders.  Thus, in a low range of managerial ownership, 
entrepreneurial firm managers should be more likely than other managers to act in shareholders‟ interests.   
 
However, as the percentage of shares held by entrepreneurial firm managers increases, certain agency costs 
are likely to rise.  As managerial ownership increases, managers bear more firm-specific risk and may become too 
conservative in managing the firm.  This is costly to outside shareholders who hold relatively more diversified 
portfolios.  Managers also become more entrenched as their share ownership increases.  Of course these problems can 
occur in larger, established firms too.  But earlier researchers have provided evidence that, at least in a low range of 
ownership, increasing managerial ownership provides a net benefit to outside shareholders of larger, established firms.  
(Might want to remind reader here as to why this is the case.  Whether increasing managerial ownership provides a net 
benefit to outside shareholders of entrepreneurial firms is an unexplored empirical issue.      
        
To examine the relationships between entrepreneurial firm value and ownership structure variables, we 
restrict our analysis to firms that have a book value of assets less than $45 million, have been incorporated for 15 
years or less, and have a five-year total growth rate in sales of at least 40%.  The resulting 108 entrepreneurial firms 
used in our analysis have high Q values (mean = 3.81, median = 2.31).  We regress Tobin‟s Q on ownership structure 
variables and we control for other factors that have been highlighted in earlier studies.  After controlling for the effects 
of firm size, research and development expenditures, financial leverage, and other factors, our linear regressions 
indicate that inside board member ownership is negatively related to Q, whereas outside board member ownership is 
positively related to Q.  In tests of nonlinear relationships, we find that inside board member ownership is negatively 
related to Q in the 5 to 25% ownership range.  Inside board member ownership is not significantly related to Q in the 
0 to 5% range or the range above 25%.   
 
In contrast to Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Mehran (1995), we 
find no evidence of a positive relationship between inside board member ownership and Q.  The results from our 
study suggest that increasing managerial ownership imposes a net wealth loss to outside shareholders of 
entrepreneurial firms, but increasing outside director ownership increases the wealth of outside shareholders.  A 
reasonable interpretation of these findings is that, for very small, young, and fast growing firms, external monitoring 
of top managers is a more effective means of reducing agency costs than is increasing managerial ownership. 
 
PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managers‟ and outside shareholders‟ interests diverge, so outside 
shareholders choose some combination of managerial monitoring and managerial bonding to reduce agency costs.  
Managers often can be effectively monitored by outside board members or by the corporate control market.  Bonding 
occurs when managerial wealth is tied to shareholder wealth, e.g. through managerial stock ownership or managerial 
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ownership of stock options.  Lippert and Moore (1995) find that managerial monitoring is a substitute, not a 
complement, for managerial bonding.   
 
Not all firms have the same degree of shareholder-management conflict and the specific type of conflict can 
vary across firms.  Large, established, slow-growing firms are more likely to have substantial free cash flow (see 
Jensen, 1986).  These firms are more likely to experience severe principal-agent conflicts associated with managerial 
perquisite consumption or managerial-motivated investments in negative net present value projects (the 
“overinvestment problem”).   
 
Small, young, fast-growing firms are more likely to have positive net present value (NPV) investment 
opportunities and less likely to have free cash flow.  These entrepreneurial firms are more likely to experience severe 
principal-agent conflict associated with managerial risk avoidance, because entrepreneurial firm managers usually 
have a larger proportion of their human and financial capital invested in the firm, relative to managers of large, 
established firms.   
 
Smith and Smith (2000) discuss the problem of undiversified entrepreneurial managers and managerial risk 
avoidance.  They develop a model of a young firm entrepreneur‟s cost of capital.  Smith and Smith demonstrate that, 
in general, a project or firm will not be as valuable to an undiversified entrepreneur as it is to a well-diversified 
outside investor.  Smith and Smith also show that, as the proportion of the entrepreneur‟s total wealth committed to 
the young firm increases, the entrepreneur‟s portfolio becomes less diversified and the entrepreneur‟s cost of capital 
increases.  Thus, increasing the entrepreneur‟s investment in the firm can lead to the underinvestment problem.  
Projects that outside shareholders wish to accept will often be rejected by the entrepreneurial firm manager.  We can 
infer from Smith and Smith‟s model that increasing the proportion of firm shares held by entrepreneurial firm 
managers increases the costs to outside shareholders associated with the underinvestment problem.  Because 
entrepreneurial firm managers are more likely to be founders, or members of founding families, they may place a 
higher value on maintaining family control than on maximizing the market price of stock.  This motive can lead 
entrepreneurial firm managers to pass up positive NPV projects that require external financing, because raising 
external financing increases the probability of losing family control.  Also, external financing is often necessary for 
entrepreneurial firms because they lack sufficient internally generated cash to fund projects.     
 
Not only does the severity and type of shareholder-management conflict vary across firms, but monitoring 
costs also vary across firms.  For example, outside shareholders of firms in heavily regulated industries, e.g., utilities 
and financial services, receive “free” monitoring services from government regulators.  Consistent with the suggestion 
that the need for managerial bonding is lower when managerial monitoring is already provided, Crawford, Ezzell, and 
Miles (1995) find that bank CEO pay-performance sensitivity (a measure of managerial bonding) was extremely low 
before the banking industry was deregulated. 
 
Because capital markets are imperfect, and it is much easier for potential bidders to obtain the financing to 
acquire a small firm, outside shareholders of small firms should receive greater monitoring services from the corporate 
control market.  As noted, Comment and Schwert (1993) conclude from a review of the finance literature and their 
own study that smaller firms are much more likely to become takeover targets than larger firms.  Smaller firms are 
generally less complex and operate in fewer industries.  For these reasons they should be easier for outside directors to 
monitor.  In short, monitoring costs should be lower for small firms than for large firms.   
 
Because entrepreneurial firm managers with low stock ownership generally receive more intense monitoring 
from the corporate control market and from powerful outside shareholders who sit on the firm‟s board of directors, the 
need to bond entrepreneurial firm managers through stock ownership is lessened.    Furthermore, as entrepreneurial 
firm managers‟ stock ownership increases, the problems of underinvestment and managerial entrenchment are 
exacerbated.  For these reasons, we hypothesize that entrepreneurial firm value will decrease with inside directors‟ 
stock ownership and increase with outside directors‟ stock ownership.     
 
Not all research points to a significant relationship between ownership structure and firm value.  Demsetz 
(1983) argues that ownership structure is an endogenous outcome which is influenced by many factors.  He suggests 
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that ownership structure can vary from firm to firm in ways that permit firm value maximization, so there should be 
no systematic relationship between firm performance and ownership structure.  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) examine the 
relationship between ownership concentration and accounting performance.  They find evidence that ownership 
structure is endogenous and they find no relationship between profitability and ownership concentration.  Loderer and 
Martin (1997), Cho (1998), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) examine the relationship between firm value and 
ownership concentration, while treating ownership concentration as an endogenous variable.  They find that 
ownership concentration does not have a significant influence on Q in a simultaneous equations setting.  However, in 
their measures of ownership concentration, these studies do not distinguish between inside and outside shareholders. 
 
As mentioned, Stulz (1988) develops a model of firm value which shows a curvilinear relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm value.  In his model, firm value initially increases as managerial ownership rises from 
zero.  However, at higher levels of managerial ownership, an increase in ownership entrenches managers and 
decreases the value of the firm.  Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) argue that increasing managerial ownership from 
zero will initially increase firm value by aligning the interests of managers and outside shareholders.  They also argue 
that, at higher levels of managerial ownership, managers become entrenched.  Therefore, increasing managerial 
ownership can have a negative impact on firm value in some range.    
 
In studies that sample larger, established, slow-growing firms, Morck, et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes 
(1990), and Mehran (1995) find that managerial ownership is positively related to firm value, at least over some 
ranges of ownership.   Morck et al. (1988) also find a positive relation between outside director ownership and firm 
value.  Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find a positive relation between inside managerial ownership and firm 
performance in the 0 to 1% range.   
 
None of these studies focuses solely on the relationship between ownership structure and firm value in small, 
young, fast-growing firms.  Because managerial monitoring can be very effective for these firms in a low range of 
managerial ownership, and increasing managerial ownership can entrench managers and promote managerial risk 
avoidance, we predict that increasing managerial ownership will not increase entrepreneurial firm value.  In contrast, 
we expect that entrepreneurial firm value will increase with the percentage of shares held by outside board members, 
because increasing outside board member ownership improves the ability of these board members to monitor and 
discipline managers. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
To gather a sample of firms, we begin with the universe of companies in the 1999 Compustat active research 
file.  We eliminate all firms in the financial services industries, the utilities industries, and firms not incorporated in 
the United States.  Screening out these firms leaves 6,792 companies.  We then impose three separate screens on these 
firms, based on size, growth, and age.   
 
To focus on very small firms, we eliminate all companies with a book value of assets greater than $45 
million.  Because firms with less than 500 shareholders and less than $10 million in assets are not required to file 
proxy statements and annual reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), we eliminate firms with 
total assets less than $10 million.  The 1,363 firms surviving after this screen represent approximately the smallest 
20% of U.S. industrial firms appearing in Compustat.   
 
To focus on fast-growing firms, we eliminate all companies that do not achieve at least a 40% increase in 
total sales over the most recent five year period, according to the 1999 Compustat file.  If a company has only been 
incorporated for the most recent three to four years, or if only three to four years of data are available for the 
company, yet it attains a minimum 40% total growth rate in that period, we allow the firm to stay in the sample.  
Firms incorporated for less than three years, or that otherwise lack data for the most recent three years, were 
eliminated from the sample.  The 273 firms surviving after this screen represent about 20% of the firms remaining 
after the size-based screen. 
 
Journal of Business Economics Research   November - 2005                                                     Volume 3, Number 11 
 17 
To focus on young firms, we eliminate all companies that have been incorporated for more than 15 years.  
We gather the age of all remaining firms, when possible, from annual reports available on-line through the SEC.  In a 
small number of cases this information is unavailable and those firms are eliminated from the sample.  After imposing 
this age-based screen, the sample is reduced to 151 firms.   
 
For each of the remaining 151 firms we attempt to gather proxy statement data and Compustat data on 
several variables.  In many cases complete data on all variables are not available for a firm and we do not include the 
firm in the final sample used for the regression analysis.  The final sample used for the regression analysis has 108 
firms.  Sample statistics for these 108 firms appear in Table 1.  The mean (median) Q value for the final sample of 
firms is 3.81 (2.31).  For the 151 firms surviving the age-based screen, we attempt to calculate undistributed cash flow 
using Lehn and Poulsen‟s (1989) method.  Necessary data are available for only 55 of these firms and the median 
value of undistributed cash flow divided by asset book value is –0.18.  (This information is not reported in Table 1.)  
Although the undistributed cash flow data are incomplete, these data in conjunction with the calculated Q values 
suggest that the firms included in our final sample are very unlikely to suffer significant agency costs of free cash 
flow.     
 
As in several prior studies (e.g., Morck, et al., 1988, McConnell and Servaes, 1990, and Mehran, 1995) that 
examine the relationship between firm value and ownership structure, we use Tobin‟s Q as our measure of firm value.  
We calculate Q as (MVE + LTD + PRF)/TA, where MVE is the market value of equity, LTD is the book value of long-
term debt, PRF is the book value of preferred stock, and TA is the book value of total assets.  Q is regressed on 
ownership structure and other variables.  We consider the following ownership structure variables.  
 
in_own  insider ownership, the percentage of firm shares owned by board members who are officers of the 
firm 
 
out_own outsider ownership, the percentage of firm shares owned by board members who are none of the 
following: officers of the firm; former officers; relatives of officers; and those directors who have 
known business relationships with the company (e.g., suppliers, attorneys, consultants, accountants, 
bankers, and insurers)  
 
in_own5  insider ownership less than 5% 
 
in_own25 insider ownership from 5% to 25% 
 
in_own25+ insider ownership greater than 25% 
 
out_own5  outsider ownership less than 5% 
 
out_own25  outsider ownership from 5% to 25% 
 
out_own25+  outsider ownership greater than 25% 
 
In addition to these ownership variables, we examine whether the status of the chief executive officer (CEO) as the 
firm‟s founder, or a member of the firm‟s founding family, is related to firm value.   
 
founder  one if the CEO is the founder of the firm, zero otherwise 
ffamily  one if the CEO is the founder or a member of the firm‟s founding family, zero otherwise   
 
The evidence on founding family control and corporate performance is conflicting.  In a study of Standard 
and Poor‟s 500 firms, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that firms run by founding families are more valuable and 
perform better than other firms.  Other evidence suggests that founding family control leads to poor firm performance, 
see, e.g., Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung (1998).  
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Prior studies have found that the following factors are significantly related to Q, and we control for these 
influences in all regressions. 
 
size  the log of book value of assets 
growth research and development expenditures divided by book value of assets 
leverage long-term debt divided by book value of assets 
 
Firm size is found to be negatively related to Q by McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Mehran (1995).  
Growth is found to be positively related to Q by Morck, et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Mehran 
(1995).  Leverage is found to be negatively related to Q by Morck, et al. (1988) and positively related to Q by 
McConnell and Servaes (1990). 
 
In addition to these control variables, we control for the year in which the data are relevant.  For most of the 
firms in our sample, the most recent Compustat data were relevant for 1998.  However, for some firms the most recent 
Compustat data were relevant for 1999 (because the Compustat file we used was created in the third quarter of 1999).  
Also, for each of the firms in our sample, we require a proxy statement so that we can determine each board member‟s 
share ownership and the status of each board member as insider, outsider, or otherwise. For some firms in the sample, 
a proxy statement was not available for the most recent year that Compustat data were available.  In these cases, to 
ensure that Compustat data and proxy statement data are time consistent, we accept proxy statements from 1996 or 
1997.  Thus, the Compustat data and the proxy statement data for each firm are matched in time, and each firm 
appears only once in our analysis, but the observation period ranges from 1996-1999.  Because market-wide factors 
very likely influenced valuation levels during this period, we control for this effect by including indicator variables in 
all regressions for the years 1996, 1997, and 1998.  The model intercept captures the effect for the year 1999.   
 
RESULTS 
 
In Table 2 we report results from regressions in which entrepreneurial firm Q is regressed on the variables 
described earlier.  In Model 1, which is specified to include only control variables, size is unrelated to firm value, 
growth is positively related to firm value (p = 0.057), and leverage is negatively related to firm value (p = 0.012).  
Mehran (1995) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) find that firm size is negatively related to firm value, whereas 
Morck, et al. (1988) find no relationship between size and firm value.  To some degree, we control for firm size 
through our sample selection method.  However, there remains size variation across sampled firms, so we include size 
in all of our regressions.   
 
Our finding that growth is positively related to entrepreneurial firm value is consistent with earlier studies 
that sample primarily larger, well-established, slow-growing firms.  Our finding that leverage is negatively related to 
entrepreneurial firm value is consistent with evidence in Morck, et al. (1988), but inconsistent with evidence in 
McConnell and Servaes (1990).  Each of the year indicator variables is statistically significant, suggesting that market-
wide factors have an important impact on entrepreneurial firm value. 
 
As shown in Model 2, we find a negative, linear relationship between inside board member ownership, 
in_own, and entrepreneurial firm value, after controlling for the other factors mentioned.  Specifically, in_own is 
negatively related to Q at the 0.016 level of significance.  Our evidence regarding insider ownership and firm value 
contrasts that of earlier researchers, who do not find a negative, linear relationship between these variables.  For 
example, our evidence contrasts that of Mehran (1995), who finds a positive, linear relationship between CEO stock 
and option holdings and Q.   
 
Although we find a negative relationship between inside board member ownership and entrepreneurial firm 
Q, in Model 3 we report that outside board member ownership, out_own, is positively related to Q at the 0.022 level of 
significance.  In Model 4 we include inside and outside board ownership, finding again that in_own is negatively 
related to entrepreneurial firm value (p = 0.061), whereas out_own is positively related to entrepreneurial firm value (p 
= 0.086).   
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Our evidence regarding outside board ownership contrasts that of Mehran (1995), who finds no relationship 
between outside blockholder ownership and Q.  We also examine whether share ownership by outside blockholders is 
related to firm value.  In results not shown in the tables, we find that outside block ownership is positively related to Q 
(p = 0.037).  The evidence presented thus far is consistent with the assertion that increasing inside board member 
ownership generally creates more costs than benefits for outside shareholders of entrepreneurial firms.  However, 
increasing the share ownership of outside directors, which increases their ability and motivation to monitor managers, 
seems to benefit outside shareholders of entrepreneurial firms.   
 
As noted, prior evidence is mixed regarding the effect of founder control, and founding family control, on 
firm value.  In Model 5 we show results when Q is regressed on the indicator variable founder and the control 
variables.  The negative coefficient on founder (p = 0.073) suggests that outside shareholders place a lower value on 
entrepreneurial firms when the CEO is the firm‟s founder.  We find similar evidence in Model 6 when founder is 
replaced with ffamily, an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the CEO is the founder or a member of the 
firm‟s founding family.  In this case ffamily is negatively related to Q at the 0.088 level of significance.   
 
This evidence above is consistent with founders or founding families extracting private benefits at outside 
shareholders‟ expense.  However, regression results using Model 7 show that the variable founder loses significance 
when accompanied by in_own and out_own.  In results not shown, ffamily also loses significance when accompanied 
by in_own and out_own.    Given the positive correlation between founder control and inside board ownership, this 
perhaps is not surprising.  Still, our evidence regarding the effect of founder and founding family control on 
entrepreneurial firm value should be interpreted with caution.   
 
Morck, et al. (1988) argue that, at lower levels of managerial ownership, increasing managerial ownership 
increases firm value by aligning managers‟ interests more closely with those of outside shareholders.  But at higher 
levels of managerial ownership, increasing managerial ownership decreases firm value by entrenching managers.  
Consistent with their argument, they find that share ownership by the two top firm officers is positively related to Q in 
the 0 to 5% ownership range, negatively related to Q in the 5 to 25% range, and positively related to Q in the range 
above 25%.  For the remaining board members (which are presumed to be dominated by outsiders) they find that 
share ownership is positively related to Q in the 0 to 5% range, negatively related to Q in the 5 to 25% range, and 
unrelated to Q in the range above 25%.   
 
In view of the evidence presented by Morck, et al. (1988), we search for a curvilinear relationship between 
inside board member ownership, outside board member ownership, and firm value.  The results of these tests appear 
in Table 3.  In Model 1 we show the regression results using all control variables, in_own5, in_own25, and 
in_own25+.  The coefficient estimate on in_own25 is negative and significant at the 0.018 level.  The coefficient 
estimates for in_own5 and in_own25+ are not significant.  Although we do find evidence suggesting that the agency 
costs of managerial entrenchment are important in the 5 to 25% range, in no range of ownership do we find evidence 
that increasing managerial ownership increases entrepreneurial firm value by aligning the interests of managers and 
outside shareholders.   
 
The results using Model 2, which includes out_own5, out_own25, and out_own25+, suggests that there is no 
curvilinear relationship between outside board ownership and entrepreneurial firm value.  When outside board 
ownership is broken up into the three ranges, none of these variables is found to have significant explanatory power.  
Model 3 shows results when in_own5, in_own25, in_own25+, out_own5, out_own25, and out_own25+ are all 
included in the model specification.  Again, no curvilinear relationship is found for outside board member ownership, 
but inside board member ownership is negatively related to firm value in the 5 to 25% range (p = 0.051).   
 
To check the robustness of our results, we replace the book value of assets with total sales as our firm size 
variable and we redefine the control variables growth and leverage so that they are scaled by total sales rather than by 
total assets.  We then estimate again all of the models appearing in Tables 2 and 3.  The results of these regressions 
support our main conclusions regarding inside board ownership and outside board ownership.  As before, the variables 
in_own and in_own25 are significantly, negatively related to Q.  In no case do we find evidence that inside board 
ownership increases firm value.  The variable out_own is significantly, positively related to Q.   
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Finally, Pi and Timme (1993) find evidence that agency conflicts between managers and shareholders 
increase when the CEO also serves as the board chair.  Other writers suggest that, as the percentage of board members 
who are outsiders increases, agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are reduced.  We test whether the 
status of the CEO as board chair or the composition of the board (as opposed to share ownership by the board) is 
related to entrepreneurial firm value.  In regressions that include the same control variables used throughout this study, 
neither of these two corporate governance variables is found to have significant explanatory power.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this study we investigate the relationship between ownership structure and the market value of firms for a 
sample of very small, young, and fast-growing firms.  The techniques that we use are similar to those employed by 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), and in more recent studies that examine how the concentration of share 
ownership influences firm value.  Morck, et al. (1988) argue that, when managerial ownership is low, increasing 
managerial ownership increases firm value by aligning the interests of managers and shareholders.  However, when 
managerial ownership is high, increasing managerial ownership decreases firm value by entrenching managers.  Using 
a sample of large, established firms, Morck, et al. (1988) find evidence that supports their argument.  
 
Our study differs from Morck, et al. (1988) and related studies primarily in sample selection.  Because we 
select very small, young, and fast-growing businesses, which we call “entrepreneurial firms,” the firms in our sample 
are more likely than others to have profitable investment opportunities and less likely to have free cash flow.  When 
managerial ownership is low, top managers of entrepreneurial firms are more likely than other managers to face 
intense external monitoring from outside board members and from the corporate control market.   
 
Because entrepreneurial firm managers face effective external monitoring and have little opportunity to waste 
free cash flow, we argue that increasing managerial ownership generally will not serve to decrease the agency costs of 
principal-agent conflict, even in a low range of managerial ownership.  In entrepreneurial firms, the principal-agent 
conflicts most likely to arise are those associated with managerial risk avoidance (because managers are undiversified) 
and managerial entrenchment.  Both of these agency problems are exacerbated as managerial share ownership 
increases. 
 
Using a sample of 108 very small firms that are incorporated for 15 years or less, and that experienced a 
rapid sales growth, we find no evidence that increasing inside board ownership increases firm value.  Instead, we find 
that inside board ownership is negatively related to entrepreneurial firm value (Tobin‟s Q) in linear regressions.  In 
tests of a nonlinear influence, we find that inside board ownership in the 5 to 25% range is negatively related to firm 
value.  The other ranges of inside board ownership are unrelated to firm value.  We provide additional evidence that 
outside board ownership is positively related to firm value.  Weaker evidence suggests that firm value is lower when 
founders or members of the founding family hold the CEO position.    
 
The evidence from this study contrasts that of Morck, et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Mehran 
(1995) and other studies that emphasize relatively larger, more established firms.  Larger, more established firms are 
more likely than other firms to suffer the agency cost of free cash flow discussed by Jensen (1986).  Morck, et al. 
(1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Mehran (1995) find a positive relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm value, at least in a low range of ownership.  We conclude from their evidence and ours that increasing 
managerial ownership is more likely to benefit outside shareholders when the agency cost of free cash flow is the 
principal-agent conflict of greatest concern.  However, increasing managerial ownership is less likely to benefit 
outside shareholders when the principal-agent conflicts of greatest concern are managerial entrenchment and 
managerial risk avoidance. 
 
NOTES 
 
1. The authors acknowledge the helpful comments of (name omitted from blind referee). 
2. See, e.g., Berle and Means, 1932, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Leland and Pyle, 1977, Amihud and Lev, 
1981, Fama and Jensen, 1983a, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, and Stulz, 1988. 
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3. On page 314 they state that “. . . we have focused on very large (and therefore usually older) corporations.  In 
newer, faster growing firms, managerial holdings probably play a more important signaling or compensation 
role than they do in our firms. . . Research on ownership structure can doubtless[ly] benefit from considering 
small firms as well.”  
4. Smith and Smith (2000) point out that managers of new ventures (entrepreneurs) often have less established 
records of achievement.  This hinders the ability of new venture managers to gain financing and raises the 
cost of failure to the managers.  If the new venture fails, these top managers may have a particularly difficult 
time finding satisfying employment. 
5. See pages 314-358. 
6. For evidence that founding family members pursue goals other than outside shareholder wealth 
maximization, see Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung (1998). 
7. This argument is less important for our study, because we sample firms with similar attributes. 
8. The 40% growth rate restriction is based on the firm‟s total growth rate over the years, not an annual growth 
rate.  Assuming a firm achieves the exact minimum 40% growth rate in five years, the compounded annual 
growth rate in sales over the five year period would be about 7%. 
9. A minority of board members are considered “grey” directors, because they do not fit the definitions of 
insider or outsider.  Grey members have the potential for conflicts of interests with shareholders (similar to 
insiders), but they also have the potential to act as managerial monitors for shareholders (similar to 
outsiders).  Our evidence, not shown in the tables, suggests that ownership by grey board members is 
unrelated to firm value. 
10. The negative relation we observe between firm value and leverage is also consistent with Myers (1977), who 
argues that debt decreases value in firms that have significant growth opportunities. 
11. We also replace in_own with the percentage of firm shares held solely by the CEO.  The results (not shown) 
suggest that CEO ownership is negatively, linearly related to entrepreneurial firm value (p = 0.092). 
12. We define outside blockholder ownership as the percentage of shares owned by all outside shareholders who 
each own 5% or more of the firm‟s shares. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Data for Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
Shown are summary statistics for 108 entrepreneurial firms that survived three sample selection criteria.  Each firm had 
$10-45million in total assets according to the most recent data on the 1999 Compustat file, was incorporated for 15 years or less at 
the end of 1998, and achieved at least a 40% total sales growth rate in the most recent 5 years (or less), according to the 1999 
Compustat file.  To match proxy data in time with Compustat data, we use data that are current in 1996-1999.  Tobin‟s Q is 
calculated as (MVE + LTD + PRF)/TA, where MVE is the market value of equity, LTD is the book value of long-term debt, PRF is 
the book value of preferred stock, and TA is the book value of assets.  Growth is calculated as research and development 
expenditures divided by book value of assets.  Leverage is calculated as long-term debt divided by book value of assets.  Inside 
board ownership and outside board ownership are the percentages of total firm shares held by inside and outside board members, 
respectively.  Undistributed cash flow is a proxy for free cash flow, calculated according to Lehn and Poulsen‟s (1989) method.  
Compustat data are incomplete for this variable, so the sample size used to calculate undistributed cash flow is only 55 firms.        
 
Variable n Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Max. Min. 
Tobin‟s Q 108 3.806 2.309 4.041 22.277 0.200 
Ln (Total Assets) ($mill.) 108 3.215 3.290 0.620 5.386 0.378 
Growth (R&D/Assets) 108 0.228 0.128 0.286 1.268 0.00 
Leverage (LTD/Assets) 108 0.095 0.024 0.140 0.565 0.00 
Inside board ownership 108 0.146 0.097 0.154 0.710 0.00 
Outside board ownership 108 0.084 0.023 0.131 0.716 0.00 
Undistributed Cash Flow 55 -0.345 -0.181 0.511 0.292 -2.145 
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Table 2: Linear Relationships between Firm Value and Ownership Structure 
 
Shown are the results of regressing firm value on ownership structure and other variables.  The dependent variable is Tobin‟s 
Q.  Tobin‟s Q is calculated as (MVE + LTD + PRF)/TA, where MVE is the market value of equity, LTD is the book value of 
long-term debt, PRF is the book value of preferred stock, and TA is the book value of assets.  Size is the log of total asset book 
value.  Growth is calculated as research and development expenditures divided by book value of assets.  Leverage is calculated 
as long-term debt divided by book value of assets.  Each firm‟s data is collected for 1996, 1997, 1998, or 1999, whichever is 
most current and complete.  The variables 1996, 1997, and 1998 are indicator variables which take a value of one if the firm‟s 
data were current in 1996, 1997, or 1998, respectively.  The intercept captures the effect for 1999.  The variables in_own and 
out_own are the percentages of total firm shares held by inside and outside board members, respectively.  The variable founder 
is an indicator variable set to one if the CEO is the firm‟s founder.  The variable ffamily is an indicator variable set to one if the 
CEO is the founder or a member of the founding family.  P-values are shown in parentheses.  The number of observations is 
108 firms.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
intercept 7.911 
(0.004) 
9.77 
(0.000) 
7.653 
(0.004) 
9.198 
(0.001) 
8.839 
(0.001) 
8.864 
(0.001) 
9.325 
(0.001) 
size -0.247 
(0.716) 
-0.408 
(0.541) 
-0.309 
(0.643) 
-0.423 
(0.522) 
-0.316 
(0.639) 
-0.334 
(0.621) 
-0.428 
(0.519) 
growth 2.400 
(0.057) 
1.176 
(0.373) 
2.298 
(0.062) 
1.346 
(0.305) 
1.961 
(0.121) 
1.995 
(0.115) 
1.338 
(0.309) 
leverage -6.599 
(0.012) 
-6.808 
(0.008) 
-7.394 
(0.004) 
-7.375 
(0.004) 
-7.089 
(0.007) 
-7.040 
(0.007) 
-7.529 
(0.004) 
1996 5.422 
(0.050) 
6.003 
(0.027) 
5.199 
(0.055) 
5.714 
(0.034) 
5.456 
(0.046) 
5.418 
(0.048) 
5.652 
(0.036) 
1997 -3.583 
(0.004) 
-3.663 
(0.002) 
-3.366 
(0.006) 
-3.479 
(0.004) 
-3.590 
(0.003) 
-3.592 
(0.003) 
-3.476 
(0.004) 
1998 -4.045 
(0.000) 
-4.347 
(0.000) 
-4.056 
(0.000) 
-4.295 
(0.000) 
-4.171 
(0.000) 
-4.190 
(0.000) 
-4.304 
(0.000) 
in_own  -5.941 
(0.016) 
 -4.734 
(0.061) 
  -3.919 
(0.164) 
out_own   5.976 
(0.022) 
4.585 
(0.086) 
  4.456 
(0.097) 
founder     -1.283 
(0.073) 
 -0.522 
(0.508) 
ffamily      -1.226 
(0.088) 
 
Adj. R2 0.251 0.286 0.282 0.300 0.268 0.265 0.296 
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Table 3: Nonlinear Relationships between Firm Value and Ownership Structure 
 
Shown are the results of regressing firm value on ownership structure and other variables.  The 
dependent variable is Tobin‟s Q.  Tobin‟s Q is calculated as (MVE + LTD + PRF)/TA, where MVE is the 
market value of equity, LTD is the book value of long-term debt, PRF is the book value of preferred 
stock, and TA is the book value of assets.  Size is the log of total asset book value.  Growth is calculated 
as research and development expenditures divided by book value of assets.  Leverage is calculated as 
long-term debt divided by book value of assets.  Each firm‟s data is collected for 1996, 1997, 1998, or 
1999, whichever is most current and complete.  The variables 1996, 1997, and 1998 are indicator 
variables which take a value of one if the firm‟s data were current in 1996, 1997, or 1998, respectively.  
The intercept captures the effect for 1999.  The variables in_own5, in_own25, and in_own25+ are the 
percentage of shares held by board insiders, when that percentage ranges from 0% to 5%, greater than 
5% to 25%, and above 25%, respectively.  The variables out_own5, out_own25, and out_own25+ are the 
percentage of shares held by board outsiders, when that percentage ranges from 0% to 5%, greater than 
5% to 25%, and above 25%, respectively.  P-values are shown in parentheses.  The number of 
observations is 108 firms.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 9.092 
(0.002) 
7.819 
(0.005) 
8.929 
(0.004) 
size -0.493 
(0.463) 
-0.328 
(0.628) 
-0.523 
(0.442) 
growth 0.793 
(0.569) 
2.163 
(0.086) 
0.847 
(0.550) 
leverage -6.622 
(0.011) 
-7.277 
(0.006) 
-7.000 
(0.008) 
1996 5.946 
(0.028) 
4.941 
(0.075) 
5.395 
(0.050) 
1997 -3.557 
(0.003) 
-3.310 
(0.007) 
-3.363 
(0.006) 
1998 -4.465 
(0.000) 
-4.109 
(0.000) 
-4.464 
(0.000) 
in_own5 35.241 
(0.219) 
 31.188 
(0.285) 
in_own25 -16.197 
(0.018) 
 -13.862 
(0.051) 
in_own25+ -1.363 
(0.773) 
 -0.961 
(0.840) 
out_own5  -1.767 
(0.938) 
-6.494 
(0.774) 
out_own25  10.601 
(0.149) 
9.136 
(0.209) 
out_own25+  1.667 
(0.814) 
-0.611 
(0.931) 
Adj. R
2 
0.293 0.271 0.291 
 
